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This paper introduces a model for stress testing of probability of default of 
individuals. The model rests on assumption that the individual defaults if his savings 
fall below zero. The probability of default is then described as a function of several 
macroeconomic indicators such as wages, unemployment and interest rates. Stress 
testing is carried out by applying exogenous stress scenarios for development of 
these indicators. The model implies that sensitivity of probability of default to the 
stress is mainly driven by Installment to Income Ratio and for mortgages also by 
loan maturity. Hence Installment to Income ratio is suggested as the appropriate tool 
to manage credit risk of retail portfolios.  
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1.  Introduction 
Complex credit risk management in financial institutions addresses three levels of credit 
risk: expected losses, unexpected losses, and extremal events. Expected losses, that are long-
term average losses, are covered through proper credit risk pricing and profitability 
management. Possible unexpected losses, that are higher than long-term average losses, are 
covered by capital reserves up to certain level of severity. Extreme unexpected losses above 
the severity level shall be rare by definition and hence it is not efficient to keep reserves for 
them continuously. However, the institution should foresee impact of extreme events which 
could evolve from current situation and have a plan for each such event to mitigate its impact 
if it evolves. This task is supported by stress testing. 
Stress testing is, in other words, investigation of impact of meaningfully d efined 
scenarios of future development, extreme development in particular. In credit risk stress 
testing, impact of these scenarios is measured in terms of losses to be suffered on account of 
credit risk or in terms of change in credit risk parameters. This paper focuses on impact of 
adverse macroeconomic development on probability of default of individuals.  
In line with Vasicek (2002), the background for Basel II model of unexpected losses, 
we consider two types of credit risk factors affecting probability of default: global (systemic) 
and idiosyncratic (individual). Individual factors are specific for each transaction and are 
averaged out on diversified portfolio. Global factors are common to all transactions in the 
portfolio and can be interpreted as the macroeconomic conditions. Hence the macroeconomic 
variables are in the center of our interest and are viewed as drivers of key individual factors 
such as income and level of savings. 
In literature, impact of the macroeconomic environment on credit risk has been studied 
from two perspectives. A bottom-up approach is based on data of individual clients while a 
top-down approach relies on aggregate data. This paper adopts the bottom-up approach. A 
top-down approach is used for example in Jakubí k (2007). 
When  modelling credit stress in the Czech Republic the following issues are faced 
regarding macroeconomic variables: 
l  The transitive economy has not experienced regular economic cycle. The economic 
downturn in nineties of the last century was driven by specific economic conditions 
that are not likely to repeat. 
l  In last ten years the economic conditions gradually improve.   2 
l  Retail banking business has been dynamically developing within relatively short time 
from almost zero to its contemporary complexity.  
Moreover, the portfolio is usually closely controlled by the Risk Management and 
hence we will develop a theoretical macroeconomic model rather than any statistical model. 
A clear story behind the results is also an advantage of this approach so that it can better 
serve ”as a diagnostic tool to improve the institution’ s understanding of its risk profile“. It is 
another important reason for stress testing as pointed out by Committee of European Banking 
Supervision (2006). 
The fundamental paper in the field of corporate default rate modelling and bond pricing 
is by Merton (1974). This paper deals with modelling default rate of individual clients, which 
is not a topic frequently discussed in literature. We adopt the approach by Merton (1974) and 
modify it for the loans of individuals. Heřmánek et al. (2007) refer to ”different sensitivities 
of corporations and households to the macroeconomic environment“ which supports the need 
to build the model for individual clients differently. 
Merton (1974) states that ”on the maturity date, the firm must either pay the promised 
payment to the bondholders or else the current equity will be valueless.“ He concludes that 
the firm will default if the value of equity is lower than the promised payment. This 
conclusion is based on the assumption that ”the firm cannot issue any new senior (or of 
equivalent rank) claims on the firm nor can it pay cash dividends or do share repurchase prior 
to the maturity date of the debt“.  
If we adopted this approach to the case of individuals, we would state that the client 
defaults if and only if the value of his property (incl. the net present value of his future 
income) is lower than the promised payment. However, assumption that the client cannot 
issue any claims on his property is not so realistic as it is in the case of firms. Hence, we will 
abstract of the client’s property and focus solely on his income and savings. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 0 introduces the underlying dynamic model 
of client’s income and savings. In section  0, the default is defined and sensitivity of 
probability of default to changes of macroeconomic variables is investigated. Section 0 deals 
with issues concerning implementation of the model. In section 0, an example of results of 
the model is presented. Section 0 concludes. 
 
2.  Model of Income and Savings 
In this section, we will develop a dynamic model of individual’s income and savings. 
The model will be used later for computation and stress of PD. 
The following notation will be used throughout the paper: Macro variables are denoted 
by capital letters while the variables concerned with an individual client or a loan are denoted 
in lowercase. 
The nominal income  it is divided between the consumption  ct, sum of all annuity 
payments at and deposit st – st-1 (1 + r
s
t-1), 
( ) [ ], r + s s + a + c = i
s
t t t t t t 1 1 1 - - -   (1) 
where st is the amount of savings and r
s
t-1 is an interest rate on savings per one interest 
period. To simplify formulae, refer to savings accrued in time t as 
( ). 1 1 1
s
t t t r + s s - -
* ”   (2)   3 
We conservatively assume that each client who is borrowing money has zero available 
savings in the time of loan granting, i.e.  
s0 = 0.  (3) 
If the client has savings at the time of loan granting he will spend them and borrow only 
the rest of the money needed. 
Let consumption ct depend linearly on disposable income plus savings coming from the 
previous period, namely, 
[ ], P γ a i + s γ + P γ = c t t t t t t
* * * - - ￿   (4) 
where γ
* is the client’s minimum level of real consumption and it is assumed to be 
constant over time, Pt is a price level in time t. Hence, γ
*Pt is the client’s minimum nominal 
consumption. 
The coefficient γ  ˛ [0,1] is a marginal propensity to consumption. When the client’s 
income (or savings coming from the previous period) increases by 1 CZK his n ominal 
consumption increases by γ CZK. 
Dynamics of savings can be described using (1) and (4) as 
[ ]
( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]. 1 1
1
1 1 t t t
s
t t
t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
P γ a i + r + s γ =
P γ a i + s γ =
P γ a i + s γ P γ a i + s =




* * * *
*
- - ￿ -
- - ￿ -
- - ￿ - - -
- -  
(5) 
Variables at and Pt are given exogenously, dynamics of income it is specified hereunder. 
Denote ī0 the equilibrium client’s income in time 0 and It the nominal per capita income 
in the economy in time t. Assume that ln (it / It) is the AR(1) process with intercept. The 
intercept term is given by the ratio of the client’s equilibrium income to the per capita income 
in the economy. This ratio is assumed to be constant over time. 
Hence, we can write the income equation as 



















  (6) 
where 0  <  α  <  1 is an autoregression coefficient, and assume that εt has a distribution 
with zero mean. Logarithm of income in time t can be expressed as 
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3.  Probability of Default 
3.1  Definition of Default 
For the sake of definition of default assume that the client cannot borrow additional 
money or restructure the debt. Hence default occurs when client’s income plus savings 








*Pt. By equation (5), this is equivalent to the condition when the current 
volume of savings falls to negative values, st < 0. 
Let us define the default formally. Let D t be the random event that the client is in 
default in time t. Then 
0. D < st t ￿   (8) 
Dt will be studied in sensitivity analysis.  
Analogically let D1,t be the event that the client defaulted in time period from 1 to t, 
{ } 0. min D 1,... 1, < st t , = k t ￿   (9) 
D1,t will be studied in PD dynamics analysis. 
3.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
We will determine the transaction-specific factors affecting sensitivity of PD to the 
stress of macroeconomic conditions. It will allow to identify potentially risky parts of retail 
portfolios. 
When performing the sensitivity analysis, we will start with a given (typically expected) 
PD in time t under the given loan parameters and macroeconomic conditions in time t and t –
 1. We will inspect change of PD caused by a change (stress) in macroeconomic conditions in 
time t having all the parameters in time t – 1 constant. The variables concerned with the 
changed conditions will be marked by a prime, e.g. Pt’, while the original variables remain 
denoted in the simple way, e.g. Pt. 
Denote 
pt≡ P[Dt]   (10) 
For expectation of ln it given by (7) we have conditionally on information prior to t: 
[ ]
( ) . ln
ln
ln 1 ln


























Since values of variables from time t – 1 are known in time t and It is exogenous, all the 













  (12) 





s a + P γ
F
=
s a + P γ
< ε
=
s a + P γ
<
i =
s a + P γ < i =















































where F is the CDF of exp(εt). 
Assume that  
pt > 0.  (14) 
When F is continuous, we can uniquely define F
–1[pt] and express the consumption 




t t t t
P




  (15) 















  (16) 










s ’ ’+a P γ




  (17) 
After substitution of equation (15) into (17) and due to (12), 
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  (18) 
The ratio at / î t will be called Installment to Income Ratio (IIR), st
*
 / î t is referred to as 
the Savings to Income Ratio (SIR) in the next paragraphs. 
Discussion of the theoretical findings derived can be found in section 0.   6 
3.3  Force of Habit: The Alternative Approach 
In this section, we present a less traditional approach. It leads to simpler results and may 
be more realistic for some economists. It is presented as a possible alternative only and will 
not be discussed in the next sections. 
We can use the per capita consumption Ct instead of the price index, i.e. set 
Pt := Ct .  (19) 
Justification of this approach is in the work of Abel (1990), who argues that the 
individual’s utility depends on the ratio of his consumption to the lagged
1 cross-sectional 
average level of consumption. This approach is now popular in financial theory, see for 
example Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  
To illustrate its reasonability on the practical example, consider a mortgage lasting 20 
years. In the year 1988, which is exactly 20 years ago, people had no cell phones. In the year 
2008, a cell phone belongs to the necessary equipment and people must buy it for their 
income. This rise of expenditures is not contained in the consumer price index. When cell 
phones (similarly as any other goods) entered CPI, only weights of the goods changed and it 
caused no immediate inflation. On the other hand, it was immediately reflected in the rise of 
per capita consumption. 
Adopting this approach to our model, the former minimum real consumption γ
* would 
then express the minimum consumption relative to the per capita consumption in the 
economy. Loosely speaking, γ
* is the minimum living standard of the client relative to his 
neighbors. 
Assume that on macroeconomic level, per capita consumption is the constant proportion 
of per capita income It, 
Ct = ρIt .  (20) 
Hypothesis of It / Ct constancy on the U.S. economy data spanning from Q1 1974 to Q1 
1998 is discussed by Hayashi (2000), p. 648. The cointegration test of ln It and ln Ct (without 
the intercept term) is performed with the null hypothesis of no cointegration. His results 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration on the subsample from Q1 1950 to Q4 1986, 
hence support cointegration. On the whole sample, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
not rejected. The reason is the declining personal saving rate from the mid 1980s. However, 
for our purposes, assumption of the constant personal saving rate is realistic enough. 
By equations (19) and (20), Pt is defined as 
Pt = ρIt ,  (21) 
hence the price level is no longer necessary. Then, equation (5) becomes 
( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]. 1 1
1
1 1 t t t
s
t t
t t t t t
ρI γ a i + r + s γ =




- - ￿ -
- - ￿ -  
(22) 
Assumptions about it dynamics remain unchanged and hence equations (7) and (11) 
hold. 
                                                           
1 We will use the non-lagged average level of consumption because it results in a simpler formula but the 
lagged consumption could be employed as well.   7 
Now we can provide the sensitivity analysis under the new assumptions. By (21), 
equation (18) becomes 
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  (23) 
We can see that ratio of the changed and original real income does not affect  pt’ 
anymore. Justification is that both the income and average consumption (used instead of the 
price level) changes proportionally with the per capita income. In other aspects, conclusions 
are similar to those of equation (18). 
 
4.  Model Implementation 
This part of the paper deals with issues concerning calibration of the theoretical models 
established heretofore. Tentative scenarios of future development of the Czech economy are 
given exogenously and referred to in section 0. Section 0 discusses relationship between the 
loan interest rate and interest rate in the economy. Annuity dynamics in case of re-fixes is 
inspected in section 0. Distribution of income change is selected in section 0. 
 
4.1  Stress Testing Scenarios 
Trajectories for development of the economy are exogenous to our model. Several 
tentative scenarios are provided, covering beside the expected development the following 
unfavorable types of evolution: recession and growing interest rates. 
Expected scenario is the point prediction of macroeconomic development. Recession 
will negatively affect incomes, i.e. wages decline and unemployment increases. Scenario with 
growth of interest rates is crucial for mortgage loans stress testing. 
 
4.2  Interest Rates 
For the loans that are assumed to be re-fixed in the future, the new loan nominal interest 
rate  per one period  rt must be computed. Denote  Rt interest rate  per one period in the 
economy. 
For simplicity we will assume a constant additive gross margin. Hence if the loan is re-
fixed in time t > 0, its new interest rate will be  
rt = r0 – R0 + Rt ,  (24) 
where Rt is a nominal interest rate in the economy in time t. 
 
4.3  Annuity Dynamics 
For simplicity assume in this section that the client has only one loan subject to interest 
rate refix. Let at and vt denote annuity and residual outstanding amount of the loan as at time 
t. As refixes are usual only for mortgages this assumption is realistic, moreover, it is only a 
technical complication to generalize the analysis for more loans with annuity change.   8 
For consumer loans, annuity is constant over the whole life of the loan. For vanilla 
mortgage loans, annuity changes take place in agreed time of contract re-fix and depend on 
the interest rate as at the time of refix.  
Assume that re-fix takes place in time  t. Maturity  n, typically in months, will be 
expected to be fixed, i.e. only annuity, not time to maturity, changes in the time of re-fix. 
Denote τ time of previous interest rate fixation or loan granting. Then the residual 
outstanding amount in time t can be computed as the amount that remains to be paid with 
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a = a   (27) 
For the sensitivity analysis, we need the ratio of the changed and original annuity. 
Information prior to time t – 1 is known and hence aτ and rτ remain unchanged. Ratio of the 





































  (28) 
 
4.4  Distribution of Income Change 
Loans can be paid off from various sources of income, such as wage, rent, interests, 
dividends etc. However, wage strongly prevails for most clients and hence we will focus on 
this source of income in our analysis.  
Income should reflect also the possibility of being unemployed. When losing a job the 
client receives social aid from the state. Other sources of income in such situation may be: 
withdrawal of savings, work in the grey economy or help of client’s family or friends. We 
will assume that possible unemployment is already incorporated in the process of income.  
In equation (7), εt is assumed to have a distribution with zero mean. Here tentatively 
assume that εt / σ has a Student distribution with d > 1 degrees of freedom, its CDF will be 
denoted G. (Note that mean of the Student distribution with d > 1 degrees of freedom is 0.) 
Then,  
F[x] ≡ G[(ln x)/σ ; d],  (29) 
where σ > 0 is the scaling factor.    9 
5.  Results 
5.1  Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity to the stress varies across clients. We will determine its main drivers in this 
section using the theoretical findings from section 0 with details about annuity and income 
change distribution from sections 0 and 0. 
Remind that the sensitivity analysis studies one-period changes and period of annuity 
payment is usually one month. Parameters of the model will be chosen with respect to this 
fact. They will reflect the scenario of growing interest rates, inflation and real income, which 
will turn out to be the riskiest one for mortgages. 
The stressed annual loan interest rate will be probably 0.25% or at most 0.5% above the 
expected rate. For the annual expected interest rate of 5.5%, the expected monthly rate is 
rt = 0.055/12 and the stressed will be chosen rt’ = 0.0575/12. Figure 1 shows dependence of 
the annuity stress on the stress of interest rates. The sensitivity increases with the growing 
time to maturity. For the typical mortgage loan 240 months to maturity and discussed rt, rt’ 
we have at’ / at ≈ 1.02. This value is used in the graph of equation (18), see Figure 2. 
Growing interest rates are usually accompanied by the increase of inflation. We will 
assume a monthly price level stress by 0.5%. The stressed real income is assumed to increase 
also by 0.5% and so the nominal income grows by 1%.  
Client’s IIR is chosen to be 0.6 and SIR 0.2. Parameters of the income distribution are 
set to be d = 4 and σ = 0.02. 
Impact of IIR and SIR is depicted in the upper two graphs of Figure 2. IIR has clearly a 
greater effect on the PD stress because real annuity change is higher than the price level 
stress. Sensitivity to the choice of the distribution parameters is presented in the middle part 
of the figure, details of the two graphs for pt < 0.1 are plotted below. While the degrees of 
freedom d impact the stress significantly less than the scale parameter σ for  pt ≈ 0.5, the 
situation is exactly opposite for pt ≈ 0 (the case of most loans). 
To sum up, the following transaction-specific drivers of sensitivity to stress were 
identified: IIR, SIR and the time to maturity. 
IIR determines the sensitivity of PD change caused by the stress of real annuity. The 
nominal annuity is either constant (consumer loans) or may be changed (mortgages). Its 
change is then caused by the stress of loan interest rate and the extent is determined by the 
time to maturity. Another factor contributing to real annuity and the only one for consumer 
loans is the price level. It is relatively less volatile than the nominal annuity in time of re-fix.  
SIR expresses sensitivity to the stress of price level. The purchasing power of savings 
depends on the price level, hence clients with relatively high savings are subject to risk of 
price level stress but, on the other hand, they are generally less risky than those with no 
savings. However, level of savings depends on client’s decision and cannot be directly 
influenced by the financial institution. 
Hence, the most risky segment are mortgages with principal risk drivers being large IIR 
and long time to maturity.   10 
5.2  Dynamics of PD 
We will demonstrate the dynamic model on the example in this section. The exogenous 
scenarios of macroeconomic development are presented in Figure 3. They specify the annual 
interest rate 12Rt, index of per capita income  It (wages adjusted for the income of the 
unemployed) and price level index Pt. The time period is equal to one month. 
Realization of client’s savings and income development was performed via equations 
(5) and (7) using error terms of the income change εt generated from the distribution (29). 
This step was repeated 1 000 000 times and rates of default computed. 
The following loan and client properties were used in the simulation: 
a0 











=  12 000 CZK 
=  20 000 CZK 
=  5 000 CZK 
=  240 
=  0.055/12 
=  0 
=  0.5 
=  0.05 
=  0.02 
=  4 
In the first example, loan interest rate is re-fixed each 12 months using the algorithm 
described in section 0. This is the case of a mortgage loan. Results can be seen in Figure 4. In 
the first graph there is the mortality function from the time of loan granting till the time t. The 
second graph describes probability of default in time t of the loans performing till time t – 1. 
The third and fourth graph depicts development of annuity and loan interest rate in time.  
In the second example, parameters of the loan are the same but annuity is constant over 
the whole life of the loan (resp. at least for the observed period). This may be the case of 
consumer loan or mortgage loan with a long fixation period. Note that maturity of the loan 
does not matter in this case. Default rates are depicted in Figure 5. 
In both examples but especially in the second one, we can observe peak in P[Dt | ¬D1,t–
1] in time t = 1. It is due to the fat-tailed distribution of income change: The peak is even more 
significant for d = 1 and not present for d = ∞ . 
The gradual increase of P[Dt | ¬D1,t– 1] after time t = 2 is caused by decreasing income of 
part of the clients. Contrary to this acts the effect of increasing average savings of those who 
did not default, which prevails in our example after the time of t ≈ 10, when PD starts to 
decline. 
While in the second example no serious impact of different scenarios on PD is observed 
we have identified a serious risk of interest rate increase in the first example. It is caused by 
re-fixation of mortgage loans, when annuity substantially increases and causes the immediate 
growth of the probability of default of the non-defaulted loans in the next months. 
 
 
   11 
6.  Conclusion 
We proposed a dynamic macroeconomic model of individual client’s PD. Scenarios of 
macroeconomic development and eventual fixation periods were specified exogenously. 
The transaction-specific drivers of sensitivity to the stress were identified to be IIR, SIR 
and for mortgages also time to maturity. IIR determines sensitivity to the stress in real 
annuity, which is either given solely by the price level stress for the fixed nominal annuity or 
contains also nominal annuity change depending o n the interest rate stress and time to 
maturity. SIR expresses sensitivity to the stress of price level. Although clients with high SIR 
are more sensitive to the stress, they are generally less risky. However, level of savings 
cannot be directly influenced by the financial institutions. 
In the empirical simulation, an important risk was found in the segment of mortgages  
under the scenario of growing interest rates. IIR and time to maturity are the key risk drivers 
in this case. 
This conclusion sends also another clear message: Potential allowing for higher IIR and 
maturity length for mortgages in the granting process should be treated carefully. 
An alternative approach based on the habit formation was presented. It does not require 
the exogenous price level and yields simpler results. Conclusions under this approach are 
similar.  12 
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Figure 1: Results of equation (28) for rt = 0.055/12, i.e. 5.5% p.a. 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of PD to the change of parameters. The reference values are IIR 
at / î t = 0.6, SIR  st
*
 / î t = 0.2, price level stress  Pt’ / Pt = 1.005, per capita income stress 
It’ / It = 1.01, annuity stress at’ / at = 1.02, degrees of freedom d = 4, scaling parameter σ = 0.02, 
if not specified differently in the graph. 
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Figure 3: Scenarios of the macroeconomic development: interest rate p.a. 12Rt, index of 
per capita income It and price level index Pt. 
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Figure 5: PD’s under different scenarios with constant annuity. 
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